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This   chapter   examines   the   ethical   case   that   can  be  mounted   for   veganism.  
Because   there   has   been   comparatively   little   discussion   in   ethics   focused  
directly  on  veganism,   the  central   aim  of   this   chapter   is   threefold:   to  orient  
readers  to  (some  of)  the  most  important  philosophical  literature  relevant  to  
the  topic,  to  provide  a  clear  explanation  of  the  current  state  of  the  ethical  case  
for  veganism,  and  to  focus  attention  on  the  most   important  outstanding  or  
underexplored  questions  in  this  domain.  The  chapter  examines  the  range  of  
positions  that  deserve  to  be  called  ethical  veganism,  and  some  of  the  types  of  
reasons  that  philosophers  can  potentially  appeal  to  in  arguing  for  veganism.  
It   then  spells  out   the  core  of   the  most  promising  case   for  veganism,  which  
argues   directly   for   the   wrongness   of   making   animals   suffer   and   die.   The  
chapter   then   considers   three   ways   of   arguing   from   this   conclusion   to   an  
ethical  defense  of  the  vegan  lifestyle,  which  appeal  respectively  to  the  ethical  
significance   of   the   effects   of   individual   use   of   animal   products,   of   group  
efficacy,   and   of   complicity   with   wrongdoing.   The   chapter   concludes   by  





















On  one  natural  gloss,  veganism  is  a  pattern  of  living:  roughly,  to  be  vegan  is  
to  avoid  eating  or  otherwise  using  products  made  from  or  by  animals.  At  least  
in  our  cultural  context,  few  people  are  likely  to  just  find  themselves  becoming  
vegans,  in  the  way  that  one  might  find  oneself  eating  too  much  saturated  fat,  
or   possessing   an   alarming   quantity   of   paisley   clothing.   Rather,   people   are  
likely  to  become  vegan  as  a  result  of  (more  or  less  explicit)  ethical  reflection.  
This   chapter   examines   the   ethical   case   that   can  be  mounted   for   veganism.  
While  I  take  the  ethical  case  for  veganism  to  be  very  promising,  my  aim  in  this  
chapter   is   not   polemical.   Because   there   has   been   comparatively   little  
discussion   in   ethics   focused   directly   on   veganism,  my   central   hope   in   this  
chapter  is  instead  to  help  foster  substantive  progress  in  that  discussion.  I  aim  
to  do  this  by:  (i)  orienting  readers  to  (some  of)  the  most  important  literature  
relevant  to  the  topic,  (ii)  providing  a  clear  explanation  of  the  current  state  of  
the   ethical   case   for   veganism,   and   (iii)   focusing   attention   on   the   most  
important  outstanding  or  underexplored  questions  in  this  domain.    
I   begin   by   examining   and   organizing   the   range   of   positions   that  
deserve  to  be  called  ethical  veganism  (§1).  I  then  discuss  (some  of)  the  range  
of   types  of   reasons   that  philosophers  can  potentially  appeal   to   in  making  a  
case   for   veganism   (§2).   In  my   view,   the  most   promising   case   for   veganism  
begins  by  arguing  directly  for  the  wrongness  of  making  animals  suffer  and  die  
(§3).   There   are   several   important   and   different   potential   strategies   for  
connecting  this  conclusion  to  the  defense  of  a  vegan  lifestyle.  In  §4  I  consider  
three  such  strategies,  which  appeal  respectively  to  the  ethical  significance  of  
the   effects   of   individual   use   of   animal   products,   of   group   efficacy,   and   of  
complicity   with   wrongdoing.   I   conclude   by   examining   several   relatively  
neglected  complications  facing  the  ethical  case  for  veganism  (§5).    
  
  
1. What  is  ethical  veganism?  
  
I  began  above  by  glossing  veganism  as  a  kind  of  lifestyle:  one  that  rejects  the  
use  of  products  made  from  or  by  animals  (hereafter:  animal  products).   It   is  
worth  noting  that  one  might  also  think  of  veganism  as  a  commitment  to  this  
sort   of   lifestyle:   this   would   permit   us   to   understand   someone  with   such   a  
commitment,  who  occasionally   succumbed  to  omnivorous   temptation,  as  a  
weak-­‐willed  vegan.    
Ethical  veganism  is  the  class  of  ethical  views  that  ascribe  some  positive  
ethical  evaluation  to  that  lifestyle.  In  what  follows,  I  will  understand  ethical  
evaluation  quite  broadly:  for  example,  I  will  take  self-­‐interest  to  be  an  ethical  
consideration.  In  order  to  focus  on  what  is  distinctive  of  ethical  veganism,  it  
is  useful   to  contrast   it  with   two  paradigmatically   contrasting  views.  Ethical  
vegetarianism  makes  a  strong  distinction  between  using  products  made  from  
animals   (e.g.   meat),   and   products   made   by   animals   (e.g.   milk),  
characteristically   objecting   to   use   of   the   former,   but   not   the   latter.  Ethical  
omnivorism   permits   the   use   of   some   animal   products,   but   restricts   the  
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acceptable   sources   of   such   products,   to   those   that   satisfy   some   ethical  
criterion.      
There  are  many  possible  versions  of  ethical  veganism.  To  begin,  it  will  
be  useful  to  consider  a  very  strong  version:  
  
Broad  Absolutist  Veganism     It   is   always  wrong   to   use   any   product  
made   from   or   by   any   member   of   the  
animal  kingdom  
  
Broad  Absolutist  Veganism  contrasts  with  vegetarianism  and  omnivorism,  but  
it   is   also   implausible,   for   several   reasons.  One   reason   is   its  absolutism:   the  
claim  that  it  is  always  wrong  to  use  animal  products.  This  entails  that  it  would  
be  wrong  to  press  a  leather  button,  even  if  doing  so  were  necessary  in  order  to  
avert  global  nuclear  war.  A  second  reason  is  the  broad  scope  of  this  principle  
across   the   animal   kingdom,   which   entails   that   it   is   wrong   to   use   sponges  
(members  of  the  animal  kingdom  which  wholly  lack  a  nervous  system).  The  
thesis  can  be  modified  to  avoid  each  of  these  problems.          
The  scope  problem  is  especially  potent  because  many  arguments  for  
veganism  appeal   to  properties  –   such  as   the  ability   to   suffer   –   that   are  not  
shared  by  all  animals.  It  is  not  clear  whether  there  are  any  ethically  significant  
properties  that  are  shared  by  all  members  of  the  animal  kingdom  but  not  by  
plants.1  It  is  thus  natural  to  restrict  ethical  veganism  to  focus  on  those  animals  
that   have   the   proposed   ethically   relevant   property   or   properties.   Ethical  
veganism  could  also  be  restricted  in  other  ways:  for  example,  one  can  imagine  
a  thesis  that  prohibits  dietary  consumption  of  animal  products,  as  opposed  to  
their  use  more  broadly.  In  what  follows,  I  will  in  general  neglect  this  latter  sort  
of  restriction.            
The   implausibility   that   arises   from   absolutism   can   be   avoided   by   a  
defeasible  form  of  ethical  veganism,  which  allows  that  there  are  circumstances  
in  which  using  animal  products  is  permissible.  A  defeasible  veganism  might  
suggest  that  the  ethical  objection  to  using  animal  products  can  be  outweighed  
by  competing  ethical  considerations.  Several  philosophers  have  argued  that  
ethical  principles  can  also  be  defeasible  in  another  way:  by  having  exceptions  
in  which  they  do  not  count  at  all  against  a  relevant  action.2  For  example,  one  
might  think  that  if  there  is  an  ethical  requirement  not  to  use  animal  products,  
it  simply  does  not  apply  to  consuming  human  breastmilk  with  the  consent  of  
the  producer.    
Elsewhere3  I  defend  a  form  of  restricted  and  defeasible  veganism  that  
I  call:  
  
                                                                                                            
1  For  a  useful  discussion  of  this  issue,  see  Pluhar,  “Who  Can  Be  Obligated,”  191-­‐3.  
2  See  e.g.  Lance  and  Little,  “Where  the  Laws  Are;”  McKeever  and  Ridge,  Principled  Ethics;  
Robinson,  “Moral  Holism;”  and  Väyrynen,  “Hedged  Moral  Principles.”  
3  McPherson,  “Case  for  Ethical  Veganism;”  McPherson,  “Why  I  Am  a  Vegan;”  McPherson,  
“How  to  Argue.”  
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Modest  Ethical  Veganism   It   is   typically  wrong   to   use   products  made  
from  or  by  a  range  of  animals  that  include:  
cats,  dogs,  cows,  pigs,  deer,  and  chickens    
  
This  is  a  defeasible  form  of  veganism,  because  it  explicitly  signals  that  eating  
animal  products  is  only  typically  wrong.  It  is  also  restricted,  governing  our  use  
of  only  some  animals.   In  virtue  of   these   features,  Modest  Ethical  Veganism  
will  be  much  easier  to  defend  than  Broad  Absolutist  Veganism.  However,  it  is  
also  strong  enough  to  be  a  recognizably  vegan  thesis.  For  example,  in  typical  
circumstances   it   rules   out   the   use   of   products  made   from   or   by   the  most  
commonly   farmed  animals.  Weakening   the   thesis   further   –   for   example  by  
prohibiting  only  the  use  of  great  apes,  or  claiming  that  using  animal  products  
was  only  occasionally  wrong  –  would  arguably  result  in  a  thesis  too  weak  to  
deserve  the  name  veganism.        
One  could  weaken  the  vegan’s  thesis  in  a  different  way,  by  replacing  
the  core  idea  that  failure  to  be  vegan  is  wrong.  For  example,  it  could  be  argued  
that  practicing  veganism  is  ordinarily  virtuous  but  supererogatory:  above  and  
beyond  the  call  of  ethical  duty.4  Notice,  however,  that  if  combined  with  the  
view   that   vegetarianism  or   ethical  omnivorism   is  obligatory,   it  might   seem  
odd  to  call   this  view  a  version  of  ethical  veganism.  Alternatively,  one  could  
argue  that  veganism  is  a  required  aspiration,  as  opposed  to  a  require  practice.5    
Another  dimension  in  which  ethical  theses  concerning  veganism  can  
vary  might  be  glossed  as  their  modal  fragility.  For  example,  one  can  imagine  
an   argument   for   veganism   which   claimed   that   using   animal   products   is  
essentially   wrong.   This   sort   of   argument   would   entail   that   using   animal  
products   could   not   have   easily   been   typically   permissible.   By   contrast,  
imagine  a  case  for  ethical  veganism  which  grounded  the  requirement  to  be  
vegan  crucially  in  putatively  unjust  FDA  policies.  The  requirement  to  be  vegan  
would  be  modally   fragile  on   the   second  view:  using  animal  products  could  
easily  be  permissible,  on  this  view,  if  the  FDA  were  to  change  its  policies.  This  
dimension  of  the  issue  is  rarely  discussed,  and  I  will  largely  ignore  it  in  what  
follows.    
The  principles  discussed  so  far   focus  on  the  use  of  animal  products.  
While   we   have   some   grip   on   this   notion,   a   rigorous   characterization   of  
veganism  would  need  to  make  precise  which  relationships  to  animals  counted  
as   use   in   the   ethically   significant   sense.   However,   one   might   think   that  
however  use  is  understood,  characterizing  ethical  veganism  solely  in  terms  of  
use  is  objectionably  limited:  one  might  claim  that  the  core  ethical  concerns  
that  mitigate   against   using   animal   products   should   also   orient   our   lives   as  
social  and  political  beings.    
One  way  into  the  social  dimension  of  this  issue  begins  by  noting  that  
when  someone  knowingly  and  freely  performs  an  action  that  we  judge  to  be  
wrong   –   especially   as   a   consistent   pattern   –   we   typically   take   it   to   be  
appropriate   to   blame   that   agent,   and   to   feel   various   negative   emotions  
towards   them.   We   also   typically   take   it   to   be   appropriate   to   curtail   our  
                                                                                                            
4  For  a  related  idea,  compare  Harman,  “Eating  Meat.”  
5  See  Gruen  and  Jones  “Veganism  as  an  Aspiration.”  
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interactions   with   such   agents   in   various   ways.   If   eating   meat   is   typically  
wrong,  we  might  also  expect  it  to  be  blameworthy.  And  this  raises  the  question  
of  whether  vegans  should  refuse  to  be  friends  with  omnivores,  or  otherwise  
share  their  lives  with  them.6    
Veganism   also   raises   important   questions   in   political   philosophy.  
Generally,  we  can  ask:  should  the  status  of  non-­‐human  animals  be  a  central  
dimension  by  which  we  evaluate  polities?7  In  the  context  of  ideal  theory,  we  
can  ask:  Would  the  use  of  non-­‐human  animals  be  absent  from,  outlawed,  or  
punished   in   an   ideal   polity?8   Or   are   certain   uses   of   non-­‐human   animals  
examples   of   ethically   objectionable   behavior   that   should   nonetheless   be  
tolerated   in   a   well-­‐functioning   society   characterized   by   reasonable   ethical  
disagreement?   In  our  non-­‐ideal  circumstances,  we  can  ask  whether  various  
forms   of   conventional   or   radical   political   action   on   behalf   of   animals   are  
required  or   supererogatory   on   the  basis   of   the   considerations   that   support  
veganism.9  
This  section  has  surveyed  a  range  of  dimensions  on  which  variants  of  
ethical  veganism  might  be  organized.  No  one  of   these  views   is   the  obvious  
candidate  to  be  the  privileged  characterization  of  ethical  veganism.  Because  
of  this,  keeping  the  range  of  possible  variants  of  the  view  in  mind  is  important:  
some  of  the  issues  raised  by  differences  between  these  views  are  badly  in  need  
of  careful  exploration.  Further,  these  views  vary  widely  in  plausibility,  and  very  
different  sorts  of  arguments  would  be  required  to  support  or  rebut  them.      
  
2. Arguing  for  veganism:  resources  
        
One  might  argue  for  veganism  in  a  wide  variety  of  ways.  In  order  to  orient  the  
reader,  I  begin  by  sketching  a  rough  taxonomy  of  the  sorts  of  reasons  that  a  
vegan  might  appeal  to.    
  
Self-­‐interested  reasons        
  
Adopting  a  vegan  lifestyle  can  potentially  impose  significant  burdens  on  an  
individual,   ranging   from   inconvenience,   to   being   cut   off   from   valuable  
traditions,  to  the  risk  of  ostracism  or  malnutrition.  Nonetheless,  it  is  possible  
to  mount  a  prudential  case  that  many  of  us  should  adopt  a  vegan  diet.  The  
core  reason  is  this:  the  overwhelming  majority  of  North  Americans  have  diets  
that  are  unhealthy  in  large  part  because  they  involve  eating  too  many  calories  
and  too  much  saturated  fat,  and  too  few  vegetables  and  whole  grains.10  One  
reason   to   choose   a   vegan   diet   is   that   it   will   tend   to   be   a   much   healthier  
alternative   to   this   status   quo.   Of   course,   one   can   be   an   unhealthy   vegan.  
However,  many  of  the  most  problematic  foods  in  the  North  American  diet  are  
ruled  out  by  veganism.    
                                                                                                            
6  For  a  vivid  depiction  of  someone  struggling  with  this  question,  see  Coetzee,  Lives  of  Animals.  
7  Nussbaum,  Frontiers  of  Justice,  325-­‐407;  Plunkett,  “Methodology  of  Political  Philosophy.”  
8  Zamir,  “Veganism,”  368-­‐9.  
9  For  discussion  of  some  of  these  social  and  political  questions,  see  Donaldson  and  Kymlicka,  
Zoopolis;  Michaelson,  “Accommodator’s  Dilemma;”  Rowlands,  Animals  Like  Us,  Ch.  10.    
10  E.g.  Walker  et.  al.,  “Public  Health  Implications.”  
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This   way   of   supporting   veganism   appears   to   face   three   limitations.  
First,  it  at  best  supports  adopting  a  vegan  diet.  It  does  nothing  to  rule  out  non-­‐
dietary  uses  of  animal  products.  Wearing  a  leather  jacket  is  not  going  to  clog  
anyone’s  arteries.  Second,  it  is  most  clearly  a  case  for  preferring  a  vegan  diet  
to  currently  typical  diets.  It  is  not  obviously  a  case  for  preferring  a  vegan  diet  
over  (for  example)  a  largely  plant-­‐based  diet  that  includes  modest  amounts  of  
lean  meat.  This  issue  is  controversial.  For  example,  Campbell  Campbell  claim  
that   the   nutritional   evidence   provides   some   support   for   completely  
eliminating  animal  products  from  one’s  diet.11  However,  even  Campbell  and  
Campbell   grant   that   they   have   a   very   modest   case   for   the   superiority   of  
eliminating   consumption   of   animal   products   entirely,   as   opposed   to  
substantially  limiting  it.      
The  significance  of  this  issue  likely  depends  in  part  on  one’s  capacity  
for  self-­‐control.  For  some  people,  the  case  for  going  vegan  on  health  grounds,  
rather  than  attempting  a  healthy  omnivorous  diet,  may  be  analogous  to  the  
alcoholic’s   reasons   to   quit   ‘cold   turkey’   rather   than   attempting   to   drink  
moderately.  For  others,  however,  a  healthy  omnivorous  diet,   like  moderate  
drinking,  may  be  easily  implemented.  And  others  may  even  find  that  making  
infrequent   exceptions   is   crucial   to  maintaining   their  motivation   to   remain  
vegan  the  rest  of  the  time.12    
  Third,  it  is  likely  that  even  if  these  sorts  of  prudential  considerations  
can  provide  reasons  to  become  a  vegan,  they  cannot  support  the  deontic  claim  
that  eating  animal  products  is  wrong.  Compare:  most  of  us  have  good  reasons  
to  get  more  exercise,  but  it  is  implausible  that  we  act  wrongly  when  we  fail  to  




Another  important  way  of  arguing  for  veganism  appeals  to  the  environmental  
consequences  of  animal  agriculture.  This  sort  of  argument  could  be  developed  
anthropocentrically,   focusing   on   environmental   consequences   that   affect  
human  beings  generally.  Or  it  could  appeal  to  the  intrinsic  ethical  significance  
of  (e.g.)  species  or  ecosystems.  The  starting  point  for  such  arguments  is  the  
idea  that  the  vegan  lifestyle  and  diet  makes  fewer  demands  upon  our  shared  
environmental   resources   than   the   typical   North   American   diet.   Consider  
three  points.  First,  it  typically  takes  far  more  arable  land  and  water  to  produce  
grain  to  feed  to  non-­‐human  animals  to  produce  a  calorie  of  meat  than  it  does  
to   produce   a   calorie   of   plant-­‐based   food.   Animal   agriculture   thus   puts  
pressure  on  increasingly  scarce  and  vulnerable  cropland  and  water  resources.  
Second,   economic   pressures   on   animal   agriculture   has   led   to   increasingly  
industrialized   farming   practices.   This   has   increased   the   amount   of  
environmentally  toxic  byproducts  generated  by  farming,  which  in  turn  further  
                                                                                                            
11  Campbell  and  Campbell,  China  Study,  242.  
12  Singer  and  Mason,  The  Way  We  Eat,  282-­‐3.  
13  However,  for  an  argument  that  human  health-­‐based  considerations  can  play  an  important  
role  in  utilitarian  arguments  for  vegetarianism,  see  Garrett,  “Utilitarianism,  Vegetarianism,  
and  Human  Health.”  
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damages   land   and  water   systems.14  Of   course,   these  dynamics   apply   to   the  
production  of  vegan  foods  as  well.  This  consideration  thus  supports  a  vegan  
diet   only   in   conjunction  with   the   first  point.  Third,   animal   agriculture   is   a  
significant   contributor   to   global   warming,   which   is   arguably   the   most  
dramatic  environmental  threat  we  now  face.15      
These   environmental   considerations   support   a   slightly   broader  
conclusion   than   the   self-­‐interested   reasons.16   For   example,   if   the  
environmental   cost   of   animal   agriculture   gives   us   reasons   to   stop   eating  
animal  products,   it  also  gives  us   reasons   to  avoid  using  animal  products   in  
other  ways.    
A  central  complication  facing  such  environmentally-­‐based  arguments,  
however,  is  that  it  is  implausible  that  all  animal  agriculture  is  environmentally  
damaging.   For   example,   farm   animal  manure   can   increase   the   agricultural  
productivity  of  farmland  without  the  use  of  industrially-­‐produced  fertilizers,  
and  animals  can  forage  on  land  that  is  not  otherwise  agriculturally  productive.  
Considerations  like  these  could  be  used  to  argue  that  there  is  a  non-­‐zero  level  
of  animal  agriculture  that  is  optimal  (at  least  from  the  point  of  view  of  overall  
human   well-­‐being).17   This   suggests   several   complications   for   an  
environmental  case  for  veganism.  This  is  especially  true  if  the  relevant  foil  is  
a  lifestyle  that  significantly  reduces,  but  does  not  eliminate,  the  use  of  animal  
products,  or  one  which  focuses  on  supporting  farms  that  use  animal  products  




Religious  traditions  provide  ethical  guidance  for  many  people.  It  is  possible  to  
develop   arguments   for   veganism   that   appeal   to   the   distinctive   ethical  
resources   of   certain   religious   traditions.   The   most   straightforward   way   of  
making  such  arguments  would  appeal  directly  to  religious  prescriptions.  For  
example,   Jainism   and   some   variants   of   Buddhism   enjoin   some   version   of  
vegetarianism.   In   most   cases,   however,   religiously-­‐based   arguments   for  
veganism  will  have  to  address  significant  arguments  against  ethical  veganism  
from  within  their  religious  tradition,  and  will  not  have  such  direct  doctrinal  
support.  Here,  the  metaphysical  principles  of  a  religion  can  be  relevant:   for  
example,   the  Buddhist   doctrine   of   transmigration   entails   that   humans   and  
animals  all  have  souls,  and  indeed  that  many  animals  were  humans   in  past  
lives.18  This  metaphysical  thesis  makes  the  case  for  ethical  similarity  between  
                                                                                                            
14  Walker  et.  al.,  “Public  Health  Implications.”  
15  Estimates  of  the  climate  impact  of  animal  agriculture  range  wildly,  from  between  a  
twentieth  and  a  half  of  all  anthropogenic  greenhouse  gas  emissions.  See  Goodland  and  
Anhang,  “Livestock  and  Climate  Change;”  Fairlie,  Benign  Extravagance,  ch.  13;  and  Food  and  
Agriculture  Organization  of  the  United  Nations,  “Role  of  Livestock”  for  competing  estimates  
of  the  climate  effects  of  animal  agriculture.  Assessing  which  of  these  competing  estimates  is  
relevant  for  ethical  purposes  requires  complex  empirical  and  ethical  argument.    
16  For  a  case  for  vegetarianism  that  appeals  centrally  to  such  considerations,  see  Fox,  
“Vegetarianism  and  Planetary  Health.”  
17  See  Fairlie,  Benign  Extravagance,  ch.  4  for  defense  of  this  idea;  Wenz,  “Ecological  Argument”  
is  an  environmentally-­‐based  argument  for  vegetarianism  that  is  concessive  on  this  front.  
18  Goodman,  “Indian  and  Tibetan  Buddhism,”  sec.  5.  
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humans  and  animals  easier  to  argue  for,  compared  to  views  on  which  humans  
are   distinctive   among   animals   in   having   souls.19   The   Christian   tradition   is  
similar  in  this  respect.  Would-­‐be  ethical  vegans  have  an  uphill  battle  against  
explicit   biblical   discussion   of   food.   But   they   can   also   appeal   to   the   ethical  
significance   of   certain   ethical   precepts   that   are  widely   accepted  within   the  
Christian  tradition.  For  example,  one  might  seek  to  make  a  case   for  ethical  
veganism   that   appealed   centrally   to   the   ethical   importance   of   reverence,  
mercy,  or  stewardship.20  This  of  course  only  scratches  the  surface  of  potential  




Each   of   the   classes   of   considerations   just   briefly   sketched   is   potentially  
important.  And  each  might  be  developed  to  make  a  case  that  we  have  reasons  
to  move  in  the  direction  of  a  vegan  lifestyle.  However,  they  leave  out  what  I  
take  to  be  the  most  significant  reasons  to  become  vegan:  reasons  that  focus  
on  non-­‐human  animals  themselves,  rather  than  focusing  on  human  interests,  
considered  either   individually  or  collectively.  The  range  of  relevant  animal-­‐
focused  arguments  in  the  literature  is  vast,22  and  I  will  not  do  it  justice.    
  
Theoretical  commitment  and  naïveté  
  
One  central  division  among  arguments  in  animal  ethics  is  whether  the  author  
presupposes   a   systematic   normative   ethical   theory,   or   hopes   to   proceed  
without   one.   Approaches   which   begin   from   commitment   to   a   systematic  
normative   ethics   are   legion.   For   example,   there   are   discussions   of   animal  
ethics   that   are   embedded   within   utilitarian,   Kantian,   virtue   theoretic,   and  
various  contractarian  and  contractualist  theoretical  structures.23      
One  influential  and  powerful  example  of  the  theoretically  committed  
approach   is   Tom   Regan’s   case   for   animal   rights.24   Regan   argues   that  
individuals  possess  various  moral  rights,  which  directly  reflect   the   inherent  
moral  worth  of   those   individuals.  By  proposing  to  ground  rights  directly   in  
moral  worth,  Regan  raises  a  pressing  question.  On  any  plausible  view  of  rights,  
                                                                                                            
19  Harvey,  Buddhist  Ethics,  156;  163.  
20  Cf.  Linzey,  Animal  Theology;  Halteman,  Compassionate  Eating.  
21  For  a  useful  discussion,  see  Doggett  and  Halteman,  “Food  Ethics  and  Religion.”  
22  For  a  useful  but  incomplete  bibliography,  see  “Vegetarianism  and  Animals,”  The  Philosophy  
of  Food  Project,  accessed  dd,  http://www.food.unt.edu/bibliography/#16.    
23  For  an  explicit  discussion  of  utilitarianism  and  vegetarianism,  see  Singer,  “Utilitarianism  
and  Vegetarianism.”  Many  other  important  discussions  make  the  most  sense  if  we  presuppose  
the  utilitarian  framework  that  their  authors  accept,  although  they  do  not  explicitly  
presuppose  utilitarianism;  see  Singer,  Animal  Liberation;  Norcross,  “Puppies,  Pigs,  and  
People;”  and  S.  Rachels,  “Vegetarianism.”  For  Kantianism,  see  for  example  Wood,  “Kant  on  
Duties;”  Korsgaard,  “Fellow  Creatures;”  and  Calhoun,  “But  What  About  the  Animals?”  For  
virtue  theory,  see  Hursthouse,  “Applying  Virtue  Ethics.”  For  various  contract  approaches,  see  
Baxter,  People  or  Penguins;  Rowlands,  Animals  Like  Us,  ch.  3;  and  Talbert,  “Contractualism  
and  Our  Duties.”  
24  Regan,  Case  for  Animal  Rights.  The  exegesis  in  this  paragraph  largely  follows  that  in  
McPherson,  “Moorean  Defense?”  
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some  things  (e.g.  you  and  I)  possess  moral  rights  (and  hence  inherent  moral  
worth),  while  others  (e.g.  a  shard  of  broken  plastic)  do  not.  What  explains  the  
difference?  Regan  argues  that  many  initially  plausible  answers  to  this  question  
are   indefensible.  For  example,   consider   the   idea   that   inherent  moral  worth  
requires  capacities  for  ethical  agency  or  sophisticated  rational  thought.  This  
would   entail   that   non-­‐human   animals   lack   rights.   However,   it   would   also  
entail  that  many  humans  –  for  example  young  children  and  severely  mentally  
handicapped  adults  –  lack  rights.  And  this  is  implausible.  Or  consider  the  idea  
that  having  moral  worth  requires  being  a  member  of  the  species  homo  sapiens.  
This  avoids  the  problems  facing  the  rational  capacity  idea,  but  it  looks  like  an  
attempt   to   explain   a   fundamental   ethical   property   by   appeal   to   something  
ethically  irrelevant.  To  see  this,  imagine  that  we  discovered  an  alien  species  
with  capacities  to  think,  feel,  love,  and  act  that  are  very  like  our  own.  Mere  
difference   in   their   genetic   code   surely   cannot   deprive   them   of   rights.  
According   to   Regan,   the   only   defensible   alternative   is   that   a   sufficient  
criterion  for  having  intrinsic  worth  is  being  the  experiencing  subject  of  a  life.25  
Since   many   of   the   animals   that   humans   eat   and   otherwise   use   are  
experiencing  subjects  of  lives,  Regan  concludes  that  these  animals  have  moral  
rights  that  are  just  as  strong  as  ours.26  Just  as  farming  humans  would  violate  
our  rights,  so,  on  this  view,  animal  agriculture  violate  the  rights  of  non-­‐human  
animals.      
Arguments  like  Regan’s  make  an  important  contribution  to  the  ethical  
evaluation  of  veganism.  At  the  very  least,  such  arguments  can  help  us  to  better  
understand  some  of  the  implications  of  promising  systematic  views  in  ethics.  
However,  the  strategy  of  appealing  to  a  systematic  ethical  theory  faces  at  least  
two   significant   limitations.   The   first   is   that   there   is   an   ongoing   fierce   and  
reasonable   dispute   between   proponents   of   various   systematic   options   to  
normative  ethics.  The  second  limitation  –  obscured  by  my  breezy  exposition  
of  Regan’s   view  –   is   that  each  of   the  central  organizing   ideas   in   systematic  
normative  ethics  can  be  implemented  in  many  ways.  The  forest  of  structural  
options   is  perhaps  most   familiar   from  discussions  of   consequentialism,  but  
the  issue  generalizes.27  Together,  these  points  may  limit  how  confident  we  can  
reasonably  be  in  any  systematic  ethical  theory  determinate  enough  to  guide  
our  thinking  about  veganism.    
The   alternative   to   such   approaches   is   to   offer   a   theoretically   naïve  
argument   for   veganism.   On   this   approach,   one   appeals   to   intuitively  
compelling  judgments  about  clear  cases,  and  seeks  to  construct  local  ethical  
principles  capable  of  explaining  the  truth  of  those  judgments,  without  appeal  
to   systematic   normative   theory.28   Even   for   philosophers   committed   to   a  
systematic  normative   theory,   exploring   the   issue   from  a   theoretically  naïve  
                                                                                                            
25  Regan,  Case  for  Animal  Rights,  §7.5.  
26  Certain  elements  of  Regan’s  total  view  complicate  this  conclusion.  See  Pluhar,  “Who  Can  Be  
Obligated,”  193-­‐7.  
27  For  a  superb  introduction  to  many  of  the  choice  points  facing  some  of  the  major  approaches  
to  systematic  normative  ethics,  see  Kagan,  Normative  Ethics.  
28  This  approach  to  animal  ethics  is  widespread;  two  exemplary  instances  are  J.  Rachels,  
“Moral  Argument”  and  DeGrazia,  “Moral  Vegetarianism;”  I  take  this  approach  in  McPherson,  
“Why  I  am  a  Vegan.”  
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perspective  may  be  illuminating,  as  it  may  may  help  to  illuminate  issues  that  
will  make  a  given  theoretically-­‐committed  approach  more  or  less  plausible  or  
dialectically  compelling.    
  
  
3. The  Naïve  Argument  from  Suffering  
  
Jeremy  Bentham  famously  said  of  animals  that:  “the  question  is  not,  Can  they  
reason?  nor,  Can  they  talk?  but,  Can  they  suffer?”29  The  line  of  argument  for  
ethical   veganism   that   I   find   most   plausible   begins   from   this   question,  
answering  that  –  at  least  for  a  wide  range  of  animals  –  the  answer  is:  yes,  they  
can  suffer.30      
The   first   virtue   of   this   approach   is   that   it   seems   evident   to   almost  
everyone   that   many   non-­‐human   animals   can   suffer.   There   are   many  
phenomena   that  might   be   grouped   together   under   the   heading   ‘suffering’.  
Two   examples   of   what   I   have   in   mind   are   intense   pain,   such   as   a   piglet  
experiences  when  castrated  without  anesthetic,  and  intense  distress,  such  as  
a  cow  or  a  sow  experiences  when  separated  from  her  young.    
The   second   virtue   of   the   approach   is   that   the   following   ethical  
principle  appears  hard  to  reasonably  resist:    
  
Suffering     Other  things  being  equal,  it  is  wrong  to  cause  suffering  
  
The  plausibility  of  Suffering  can  be  brought  out  in  several  ways.31  First  it  seems  
true  when   restricted   to   humans.   So   to   claim   that   it   is   not  wrong   to   cause  
suffering  to  animals  may  seem  like  a  case  of  ethically  objectionable  speciesism.  
Second,   many   cases   of   causing   suffering   to   non-­‐human   animals   seem  
obviously  wrong.  For  example,  it  would  be  wrong  to  catch  a  stray  rabbit,  take  
it  home,  and  torture  it  with  electric  shocks.  Third,  in  many  cases  like  this  one,  
the  wrongness  of  the  action  seems  directly  explained  by  the  fact  that   it   is  a  
case  of  causing  suffering  to  an  animal.  Fourth,  Suffering  is  modest,  in  at  least  
two  respects.  First,  Suffering  is  a  defeasible  principle,  so  it  does  not  imply  that  
causing  suffering  to  non-­‐human  animals  is  always  wrong.  Second,  Suffering  
does   not   imply   parity   between   the  moral   significance   of   human   and   non-­‐
human   suffering.   It   is   compatible  with   there  being  many   reasons  why   it   is  
typically  wrong  to  cause  suffering  to  an  adult  human  being  that  do  not  apply  
to  non-­‐human  animals.  (For  example,  causing  an  adult  human  to  suffer  may  
express  disrespect  for  their  autonomy.)    
   Most   arguments   for   veganism   (especially   those   which   seek   less  
modally   fragile   conclusions)  will   defend   a   further  principle  prohibiting   the  
killing  of  animals,  such  as:  
  
                                                                                                            
29  Bentham,  Works,  XVII.IV  n.  1  (emphasis  original).  
30  For  an  argument  against  beginning  the  case  for  ethical  vegetarianism  by  appeal  to  this  sort  
of  idea,  see  Diamond,  “Eating  Meat.”  Diamond  suggests  that  such  arguments  are  too  abstract  
and  disconnected  from  the  texture  of  our  lived  relationships  with  animals  to  form  apt  bases  
for  ethical  arguments.    
31  For  one  way  of  developing  these  points,  see  McPherson,  “Why  I  am  a  Vegan.”  
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Killing     Other  things  being  equal,  it  is  wrong  to  kill  an  animal  
  
This   principle,   however,   is   not   as   immediately   intuitive   as   Suffering.   The  
intuitive  contrast  is  well-­‐expressed  by  Michael  Tooley:    
  
it  seems  plausible  to  say  it  is  worse  to  kill  an  adult  human  being  than  
it  is  to  torture  him  for  an  hour.  In  contrast,  it  seems  to  me  that  while  
it  is  not  seriously  wrong  to  kill  a  newborn  kitten,  it  is  seriously  wrong  
to  torture  one  for  an  hour.32  
Tooley’s   wording   is   careful   here:   his   claim   is   cast   in   terms   of  what   ‘seems  
plausible’  about  ‘serious  wrongness’.  We  can  helpfully  distinguish  two  ways  of  
making  the  suggested  ethical  claim  more  precise.  Weak  Asymmetry  is  the  view  
that,  other  things  being  equal,  causing  substantial  suffering  to  an  animal   is  
more  seriously  wrong  than  killing  that  animal.  Strong  Asymmetry  is  the  view  
that  other  things  being  equal  it  is  wrong  to  cause  animals  to  suffer,  and  not  
wrong  to  kill  them.    
   Strong   Asymmetry   has   sometimes   been   endorsed.33   However,   I  
suspect   that   its   appeal   does   not   survive   reflection.   In   evaluating   Strong  
Asymmetry,  it  is  crucial  to  screen  off  cases  in  which  other  relevant  things  may  
not  be  equal.  For  example,  there  are  many  ordinary  cases  of  killing  animals  
for   (at   least   arguably)   ethically   legitimate   reasons.   Think,   for   example,   of  
overburdened  animal  shelters  euthanizing  some  of  their  wards,  or  of  culling  a  
deer  population  to  a  level  that  its  food  sources  can  support.  By  contrast,  there  
are  very  few  ordinary  cases  in  which  there  are  good  ethical  reasons  to  torture  
an  animal.  These  facts  can  potentially  mislead  us  when  we  consider  principles  
like  this  one;  we  may  unconsciously  ‘fill  in’  extraneous  assumptions  about  the  
motives  or  character  of  the  agents  involved,  and  these  assumptions  may  then  
guide  our  judgments  about  the  cases.34  In  light  of  this  point,  consider  a  case  
that   is   as   similar   as   possible   to   the   rabbit-­‐torture   case   (discussed   above).  
Suppose  that  someone  catches  a  healthy  stray  kitten,  takes  it  home,  and  then  
kills   it   by   adding   a   fast-­‐acting   and   painless   poison   to   its  meal.   This   seems  
clearly  wrong,  which  casts  substantial  doubt  on  Strong  Asymmetry.    
   What  about  Weak  Asymmetry?  Here  again,  it  is  important  to  screen  
off  distracting  assumptions  about  the  agent’s  motivations.  So  consider  a  case  
where  we  screen  off  these  distractions.  Suppose  that  you  are  given  a  terrible  
choice  at  gunpoint:  kill   this  kitten  with  a  painless  drug,  or  torture   it   for  an  
hour.  Suppose  further  that  you  somehow  know  that  if  you  torture  the  kitten,  
it  will  go  on  to  live  a  long  and  happy  cat  life.  It  would  certainly  be  easier  for  a  
decent  person  to  kill  the  kitten  than  to  make  herself  torture  the  kitten.  But  it  
is  hard  to  see  why  torturing  is  not  the  ethically  better  of  two  awful  options.  
After   all,   it   seems  plausible   that   torturing   the   kitten   in   this   case  would  be  
better  overall  for  the  kitten.  Focusing  only  on  the  kitten’s  welfare,  this  case  is  
not  much  different  from  that  of  someone  administering  a  painful   lifesaving  
                                                                                                            
32  Tooley,  “Abortion  and  Infanticide,”  40.  
33  E.g.  by  Pollan,  Omnivore’s  Dilemma,  ch.  17.  
34  This  is  inspired  by  the  analogous  point  about  our  judgments  about  killing  and  letting  die  in  
J.  Rachels,  “Active  and  Passive  Euthanasia.”  
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medical  treatment  to  an  animal,  which  seems  obviously  okay,   if  doing  so  is  
the  only  way  to  allow  the  animal  to  have  a  long  and  flourishing  life.  In  light  of  
points   like   these,   it   is  not   surprising   that   several  philosophers  have  argued  
against  Tooley-­‐style  asymmetry  claims.35  
   It  is  worth  emphasizing  that  rejecting  Weak  Asymmetry  is  compatible  
with  granting  that  killing  humans   is  ordinarily  much  more  seriously  wrong  
than  killing  non-­‐human  animals.  The  best  explanation  of  why  torturing  the  
kitten  is  ethically  preferable  to  killing  it  adverts  to  something  like  the  ethical  
significance   of   well-­‐being   or   of   the   value   of   an   entity’s   future.36   Such  
considerations   are   surely   important   in   thinking   about   killing   humans.37   If  
human  lives  are  typically  far  richer  than  non-­‐human  animal  lives,  an  account  
of  the  wrongness  of  killing  that  appealed  to  the  value  of  futures  would  partially  
explain  why  it   is  ordinarily  worse  to  kill  humans.  Further,   in  many  cases  of  
killing  humans  other  considerations  –  especially  considerations  grounded  in  
the   agent’s   autonomy   –   may   also   be   significant,   or   even   paramount.   For  
example,  consider  a  version  of   the  gunpoint  dilemma  offered  above,  with  a  
human  victim.  Here  –  as  Tooley’s  quote  suggests  –  torturing  would  ordinarily  
seem  like  the  lesser  evil.  But  now  suppose  that  the  victim  requests  –  on  the  
basis  of  substantively  reasonable  and  reflectively  stable  values  –  that  you  kill  
him   rather   than   torture   him.   In   this   case   respecting   his   autonomous  
preference  may  be  ethically  more  important  than  maximizing  his  net  expected  
welfare.        
One  might  object  to  the  line  of  argument  proposed  in  this  section  by  
arguing  that  the  ethical  asymmetry  between  humans  and  non-­‐human  animals  
runs  deeper  than  I  have  granted  thus  far.  The  most  familiar  way  to  develop  
this   objection   would   appeal   to   the   explanatory   role   of  moral   status.   For  
example,  it  might  be  claimed  that  the  core  explanation  of  why  it  is  wrong  to  
make  a  human  suffer  needs  to  appeal  to  humans’  distinctive  moral  status  as  
well  as  what  human  suffering  is  like.  Animals,  it  might  be  insisted,  lack  moral  
status  (or  have  some  sort  of  second-­‐class  moral  status),  and  so  the  badness  of  
their  suffering  cannot  render  wrongful  an  action  that  makes  them  suffer.    
This  objection  should  be  rejected.38  To  begin,  notice  that  the  objection  
threatens  to  deprive  us  of  the  most  natural  explanation  of  the  wrongness  of  
torturing   non-­‐human   animals.   A   theoretical   argument   would   need   to   be  
extremely  powerful  to  warrant  this.  But  the  idea  that  animals  lack  moral  status  
is  most  plausible  if  we  understand  moral  status  as  the  bundle  of  ethical  powers  
and   protections   characteristically   possessed   by   adult   humans   (in   a   helpful  
introduction  to  moral  status,  Jaworska  and  Tannenbaum  call  this  ‘full  moral  
status’).39  A  two-­‐year-­‐old  child  lacks  full  moral  status:  she  has  no  right  to  self-­‐
government,  for  example,  or  political  participation.  But  I  still  owe  it  directly  
                                                                                                            
35  Compare  McMahan,  “Eating  Animals;”  DeGrazia,  “Moral  Vegetarianism,”  160-­‐4;  Harman,  
“Moral  Significance  of  Animal  Pain;”  Norcross,  “Significance  of  Death;”  and  McPherson,  “Why  
I  am  a  Vegan”  
36  In  the  sense  relevant  in  Nagel,  “Death”  and  Marquis,  “Abortion  is  Immoral.”  
37  Compare  Lippert-­‐Rasmussen,  “Two  Puzzles.”  
38  For  related  skepticism  about  the  usefulness  of  ‘moral  status’  talk,  see  Zamir,  Ethics  and  the  
Beast,  ch.  2.  
39  Jaworska  and  Tannenbaum,  “Grounds  of  Moral  Status.”  
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to  such  a  child  that  I  not  torture  her.  It  is  natural  to  assume  that  the  wrongness  
of  making  the  child  suffer  is  grounded  in  her  individual  capacities.  But  if  so,  
then  the  objection  collapses,  because  many  non-­‐human  animals  have  similar  
capacities.  One  could  repair  the  objection,  for  example  by  insisting  that  the  
child   has  moral   status   simply   in   virtue   of   being   human.40   But   it   is   deeply  
puzzling  why  bare  genetic  facts  like  this  one  should  have  such  striking  ethical  
significance.    
Supposing   that   it   is   sound,   the   case   for   the   wrongness   of   killing  
animals  and  making  them  suffer  has  profound  ethical  consequences.  Consider  
the  institutions  most  directly  involved  in  raising  and  slaughtering  animals  for  
use   in   making   animal   products:   the   farms,   animal   factories,   feedlots   and  
slaughterhouses.  These  institutions  inflict  extraordinary  amounts  of  suffering,  
and  then  very  early  death,  on  the  billions  of  animals  they  raise  and  kill.41   If  
killing  animals  and  making  them  suffer  is  wrong,  then  these  institutions  (or  
the  people  who  compose  them)  act  wrongly  on  a  truly  horrifying  scale.  Stuart  
Rachels  gives  us  a  sense  of  the  scope  of  the  issue,  estimating  the  amount  of  
suffering  inflicted  by  these  institutions  as  orders  of  magnitude  greater  than  
that   inflicted   by   the   holocaust.42   Further,   our   governments   arguably   act  
wrongly  as  well,  in  virtue  of  creating  a  legal  and  regulatory  framework  within  
which   these   institutions   are   permitted   to   treat   animals   wrongfully,   and   in  
virtue  of  providing  economic  incentives  –  and  in  many  cases  direct  subsidies43  
–  for  these  institutions  to  harm  animals.  However,  the  case  for  the  wrongness  
of   killing   animals   and   causing   them   to   suffer   does   not   yet   constitute   an  
argument  for  veganism.  The  next  section  explains  the  gap  remaining  in  the  
argument,  and  explores  how  it  might  be  filled.    
  
  
4. Completing  the  Naïve  Argument  for  Veganism:  Some  Options  
  
One  could  grant  that  it  is  wrong  to  kill  animals  or  to  make  them  suffer,  but  
deny  that  this  gives  one  reasons  to  be  vegan.  After  all  –  as  is  vividly  obvious  in  
the  contemporary  world  –  eating  animal  products  does  not  require  that  one  
kill  animals,  or  cause  them  to  suffer.  As  a  defense  of  omnivorism,  this  may  
initially   smack   of   rationalization.   However,   facing   it   squarely   helps   to  
illuminate  several  of  the  most  difficult  challenges  for  constructing  a  rigorous  
ethical  argument  for  veganism.      
   We   can   begin   by   schematically   representing   the   gap   left   by   the  
argument  of  the  preceding  section,  as  follows:  
  
1. The   institutions   that  produce  our  animal  products  act  wrongly   in  a  
massive  and  systematic  way.  
                                                                                                            
40  Compare  Cohen,  “Critique,”  162.  
41  For  some  of  the  literally  gory  details,  see  Mason  and  Singer,  Animal  Factories.  
42  S.  Rachels,  “Vegetarianism.”  
43  For  example,  according  to  the  Environmental  Working  Group,  direct  US  subsidies  to  dairy  
and  livestock  totaled  nearly  $10  billion  in  1995-­‐2012.  Other,  much  larger  subsidies  –  such  as  on  
grain  used  for  feed  –  serve  to  indirectly  subsidize  US  animal  agriculture.  “Farm  Subsidy  
Database,”  Environmental  Working  Group,  accessed  dd,  http://farm.ewg.org/.  
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2. Veganism  bears  relation  R  to  those  institutions  
3. It  is  typically  wrong  (or…)  to  fail  to  bear  R  to  those  institutions  
C.     It  is  typically  wrong  (or…)  to  fail  to  be  vegan  
  
The  parenthetical  possibilities  in  premise  3  and  the  conclusion  are  intended  
to  remind  readers  of  the  range  of  possible  forms  ethical  veganism  might  take  
(discussed   in  Section   1).  Different  arguments  will,  of  course,  be   required   to  
support   weaker   or   stronger   vegan   theses.   The   central   question   is   whether  
there  is  some  relation  that  we  can  substitute  for  variable  R  to  produce  a  sound  
version   of   the   schematic   argument   just   given.   This   section   discusses   some  
important  possibilities.    
One  might  wonder  whether   the   gap   suggested   by   this   argument   is  
easily   filled.   For   example,   Rosalind   Hursthouse   suggests   that   a   truly  
compassionate   person   could   not   be   aware   of   the   cruelty   of   contemporary  
animal  agriculture,  and  continue  to  be  ‘party’  to  such  cruelty  by  eating  meat.44  
Such  self-­‐aware  omnivorism  may  feel  uncomfortable:  witness  Michael  Pollan’s  
description  of  reading  Peter  Singer’s  Animal  Liberation  in  a  Steakhouse.45  This  
sort  of  reply  seems  to  me  inadequate  for  two  reasons.  First,  it  appears  at  best  
to   support   a   very   weak   form   of   ethical   veganism,   according   to   which  
omnivorism  is  some  sort  of  ethical  imperfection.  However,  even  this  is  not  so  
clear.  Absent  further  argument  of  the  sort  to  be  considered  below,   it   is  not  
clear   that   one  must   lack   compassion   to   any   degree   if   –   for   example   –   one  
followed   the  Buddhist   teaching   that  permits  a  monk   to  eat  meat,  provided  
that  he  does  not   suspect   the   relevant  animal  has  been  killed  specifically   to  
feed  him.46                        
This  section  focuses  on  three  candidate  proposals  for  explaining  how  
ethical  requirements  on  individuals  can  be  generated  indirectly,  in  virtue  of  
relations  between  their  actions  and  some  other  bad  or  wrongful  act  or  state  of  
affairs.   These   proposals   appeal,   respectively,   to   individual   value-­‐promotion,  
group  efficacy,  and  complicity.  The  aim  is  to  assess  whether  these  proposals  
can  provide  intrinsically  plausible  principles  that  –  when  combined  with  the  
naïve   argument   of   the   preceding   section   –   support   some   form   of   ethical  
veganism.  The  proposals  that  I  discuss  are  far  from  exhaustive,  but  they  strike  
me  as  the  most  promising.47  
For   simplicity,   I   treat   these   proposals   as   ways   of   completing   the  
preceding  naïve  argument.  However,  these  proposals  have  broader  theoretical  
significance   for   the   ethics   of   veganism.   For   example,   many   broadly  
environmental  arguments  for  veganism  (briefly  discussed  in  §2)  will  face  the  
same   sort   of   gap   as   the   argument   just   sketched:   they   are   most   directly  
arguments  from  the  wrongness  of  status  quo  animal  agriculture,  not  for  the  
wrongness  of  individual  acts  of  using  animals.  In  light  of  this,  most  attempts  
to  defend  ethical  veganism  will  need  to  appeal  to  some  theory  like  the  ones  to  
                                                                                                            
44  Hursthouse,  “Applying  Virtue  Ethics,”  141-­‐2.  
45  Pollan,  Omnivore’s  Dilemma,  650.  
46  Harvey,  Buddhist  Ethics,  159.  
47  For  criticism  of  some  of  the  other  options,  see  Budolfson,  “Inefficacy  Objection  to  
Deontology,”  §3-­‐4.  
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be   considered   here,   that   propose   ethical   links   between   individuals’   use   of  
animal  products  and  the  objectionable  practices  that  create  those  products.    
       
Individual  efficacy  
  
I  begin  by  considering  the  attempt  to  cross  the  gap  by  appeal  to  the  idea  that  
the   individual   vegan   can  promote   something   ethically   important:   expected  
animal  welfare.    The  canonical  presentation  of  this  idea  by  Peter  Singer  begins  
by  granting  that  it  is  highly  unlikely  that  one’s  own  food  choices  will  ever  make  
a  difference  to  actual  animal  welfare.48  However,  Singer  suggests  this   is  not  
the  end  of  the  story.  He  suggests  there  must  be  some  (unknown)  threshold,  
at   which   –   for   example   –   increased   numbers   of   vegetarians   or   vegans   will  
reduce   demand   for   chicken   sufficiently   to   reduce   the   number   of   chickens  
made   to   suffer   in   factory   farms.   For   example,   “Perhaps   for   every   10000  
vegetarians   there   is   one   fewer   20,000   bird   chicken   unit   than   there   would  
otherwise  be.”49  However,  we  are  ignorant  of  where  the  relevant  threshold  is.  
Perhaps  we  are  away  from  the  threshold,  in  which  case  the  individual  vegan  
makes   no   difference   to   the   chicken   suffering.   But   given   our   ignorance   of  
where  the  threshold  is,  we  should  take  there  to  be  a  1/10000  chance  that  we  
are   at   the   threshold.   And   if  we   are   at   the   threshold,   an   individual   vegan’s  
refraining  from  consuming  chicken  will  save  20000  chickens  from  a  short  life  
of  suffering.50  The  expected  utility  of  this  chance  for  each  vegan  is  the  same  as  
the  expected  utility  of  certainty  that  one  will  save  two  chickens  from  suffering.  
In  a  slogan:  it  is  vanishingly  unlikely  that  one  will  make  a  difference  by  being  
vegan,  but  if  one  does,   it  will  be  a  correspondingly  massive  difference.  One  
might  then  argue  that  this  is  enough  to  entail  that  one  is  morally  required  to  
be  vegan.51  
This   sort   of   argument   faces   several   difficulties.   Some   of   these  
difficulties  are  empirical  in  nature.52  For  example,  some  have  argued  that  we  
have   empirical   reasons   for   believing   that  we   are  more   than   proportionally  
likely   to   be   stably   between   thresholds   of   the   imagined   sort.   Others   have  
argued  that  we  should  be  skeptical  of  the  ability  of  individual  buying  decisions  
to  produce  any  economic  signals  whatsoever  in  a  large  market.    
Another   objection   begins   by   querying   the   trajectory   of   aggregate  
demand  for  animal  products.  Assume  for  simplicity   that  aggregate  demand  
trends  are  stable,  without  a  lot  of  random  variation.  Suppose  first  that  demand  
is  stably  increasing.  Other  things  being  equal,  this  will  lead  to  rising  prices  and  
(eventually)  to  new  animal  factories  being  built,  as  increased  supply  becomes  
profitable.  My   veganism   cannot   prevent   a   broiler   factory   from  being   built,  
under  such  assumptions.  At  best,  it  might  conceivably  delay  its  construction.  
                                                                                                            
48  Singer,  “Utilitarianism  and  Vegetarianism.”  
49  Singer,  “Utilitarianism  and  Vegetarianism,”  335.  
50  Broilers  spend  around  six  weeks  in  the  chicken  unit  before  being  transported  for  slaughter.  
Mason  and  Singer,  Animal  Factories,  7.    
51  For  very  similar  arguments,  see  Matheny,  “Expected  Utility;”  Norcross,  “Puppies,  Pigs,  and  
People;”  and  Kagan,  “Do  I  Make  a  Difference?”  
52  See  Frey,  Rights,  Killing,  and  Suffering;  Frey,  “Utilitarianism  and  Vegetarianism  Again;”  
Chartier,  “Threshold  Argument;”  and  Budolfson,  “Inefficacy  Objection  to  Consequentialism.”  
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But  for  how  long?  Seconds?  Minutes?53  Or  suppose  that  aggregate  demand  is  
stably  decreasing.  Then  prices  will  typically  fall,  and  with  it  production.  Again,  
at   very   unlikely   best,   lack   of   my   demand   could   hurry   closure   of   a   broiler  
factory  by  a  few  minutes.  The  only  (artificially  stable)  scenario  in  which  my  
becoming   a   vegan   could   make   a   more   marked   difference   is   if   aggregate  
demand  is,  independent  of  my  choice,  stably  exactly  at  a  threshold.  Only  here  
could  my  buying  behavior  possibly  make  a  more  than  a  momentary  difference  
to   the   welfare   of   animals.   But   our   credence   that   we   are   stably   at   such   a  
threshold  should  be  much  smaller  than  Singer’s  heuristic  estimate.  It  might  
thus  be  expected  that  the  expected  benefit  to  animal  welfare  of  my  becoming  
vegan  is  likely  to  be  extremely  small.  
The   Singer-­‐style   argument   also   makes   at   least   three   important  
assumptions  about  ethical  theory.  One  (highly  plausible)  assumption  is  that  
welfare   outcomes   are   ethically   significant.   The   second   assumption   is  more  
controversial:   this   is   that   the  expected   value  of  consequences  play  a   role   in  
determining  right  and  wrong.  This  assumption  is  controversial  because  many  
philosophers   think   that   the   actual   –   as   opposed   to   expected   –   value   of  
consequences  is  what  contributes  to  determining  right  and  wrong.54    
The   expected   value   assumption   is   crucial   to   Singer’s   reasoning.   For  
example,  in  Singer’s  stylized  example,  it  is  extremely  likely  that  no  one  actually  
makes   an   objective   difference   to   animal   welfare   by   being   vegan.   For   on  
Singer’s  account,  it  is  very  likely  that  aggregate  demand  is  in  fact  stably  away  
from   a   threshold.   And   this   means   that   for   each   consumer   C,   the  
counterfactual:  if  C  were  to  be  vegan,  animal  welfare  would  be  improved  is  very  
likely  false.    
The  third  crucial  assumption  of  Singer’s  argument  is  that  the  negative  
expected  value  of  an  option  can  explain  why  that  action  is  wrong.  Notice  that  
this  is  a  stronger  claim  than  the  idea  that  facts  about  expected  value  matter  
ethically.  This  issue  can  be  illustrated  by  a  familiar  style  of  case:  I  can  choose  
to  either  spend  $1000  on  a  vacation,  or  to  donate  this  money  to  the  Against  
Malaria  Foundation.  The  expected  value  of  the  donation  is  saving  at  least  one  
person   from   miserable   sickness   and   early   death   due   to   malaria,   which  
obviously  outweighs  the  direct  and  indirect  expected  benefits  of  my  vacation.  
It  is  plausible  that  this  makes  donating  the  money  morally  better  than  going  
on  vacation,  but  it  is  controversial  whether  it  entails  that  I  would  act  wrongly  
by  going  on  vacation.55    
Despite   these   points,   evaluating   the   empirical   challenges   to   the  
Singer-­‐style   reasoning   might   be   quite   broadly   important   to   the   ethics   of  
veganism.   On   the   one   hand,   it   might   provide   a   direct   way   to   argue   that  
veganism   is   at   least   ordinarily   supererogatory.  On   the   other,   some   sort   of  
efficacy  might  be  argued  to  be  a  necessary  –  even  if  not  a  sufficient  –  condition  
for   veganism   to   be   required.   The  worry   is   that   absent   a   plausible   case   for  
                                                                                                            
53  Compare  Chartier,  “Threshold  Argument,”  240ff.  
54  For  discussion,  see  e.g.  Feldman,  “Actual  Utility.”  
55  For  relevant  discussion,  see  e.g.  Singer,  “Famine,  Affluence,  and  Morality;”  and  Cullity,  
Moral  Demands.  
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efficacy,  one’s  concern  not  to  eat  wrongfully  produced  meat  amounts  to  an  
ethically  dubious  desire  to  avoid  a  kind  of  ‘moral  taint’.56    
  
Group  efficacy  
          
As  we  have  seen,  it  is  not  trivial  to  establish  that  an  individual  omnivore  has  
any   effect   on   animal   welfare.   By   contrast,   it   is   obvious   that   all   of   the  
consumers   of   animal   products   together  make   a   difference:   their   aggregate  
demand  is  the  raison  d’être  of  the  animal  agriculture  industry.  If  demand  for  
animal  products  declined  to  zero,  wrongful  farming  of  animals  would  likewise  
decline  precipitously.  In  light  of  this,  one  might  suggest  that  the  argument  for  
veganism  should  appeal  to  the  ethical  significance  of  the  relationship  that  an  
individual  vegan  bears   to   this  group.  For  example,  one  might  complete   the  
schematic  argument  imagined  at  the  beginning  of  this  section  in  the  following  
way:    
  
1. The   institutions   that  produce  our  animal  products   act  wrongly   in  a  
massive  and  systematic  way.  
2. The   group   consumers   of   animal   products   together   act   wrongly   by  
making  the  wrongful  treatment  of  animals  mentioned  in  (1)  persist.    
3. It   is  typically  wrong  (or…)  to  be  a  part  of  a  group  that  together  acts  
wrongly  (i.e.,  in  this  case,  to  fail  to  be  a  vegan).    
C.     It  is  typically  wrong  (or…)  to  fail  to  be  vegan  
  
As  in  the  schematic  argument,  the  “(or…)”  marks  the  fact  that  one  might  argue  
for  a  variety  of  ethical  statuses  for  veganism.  Premises  2  and  3  of  this  argument  
introduce   important   and   controversial   ethical   ideas.   Premise   3   is   a   general  
claim  about  the  individual  ethical  significance  of  group  wrongdoing.  Premise  
2   is   an   instance  of  a  principle   that   tells  us   that  groups  can  acts  wrongly   in  
virtue   of   making   bad   things   happen.   Consider   a   case   that   might   help   to  
motivate  the  general  claims  here.    
Suppose   there   are   two   communities   along   a   river:   Upstream   and  
Downstream.   The   river   is   the   only   source   of   water   for   both   communities.  
Members  of  Upstream  also  dispose  of  their  sewage  in  the  river.  (This  isn’t  a  
town  policy;  it  is  just  the  prevailing  and  accepted  practice  in  Upstream.)  As  a  
result,  members  of  Downstream  are  very  often  painfully  and  dangerously  ill  
from   drinking   the   polluted   water.   Suppose,   however,   that   no   individual’s  
sewage  from  Upstream  makes  a  difference:  the  river  is  so  uniformly  polluted  
by  Upstream  sewage  that  removing  one  person’s  contribution  from  the  river  
will   make   no   difference   to   the   number   or   severity   of   the   painful   illnesses  
suffered  in  Downstream.  Suppose  finally  that  the  members  of  Upstream  know  
about   their   effects   on   Downstream,   and   could   (either   individually   or  
collectively)   safely   dispose   of   their   sewage   elsewhere,   at  modest   cost.   It   is  
plausible   that   the   members   of   Upstream   are,   collectively,   responsible   for  
wrongfully  harming  the  members  of  Downstream.  It  may  seem  plausible  that,  
in  virtue  of  this,  an  individual  member  of  Upstream  acts  wrongly  by  disposing  
                                                                                                            
56  For  relevant  discussion,  see  Appiah,  “Racism  and  Moral  Pollution.”  
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of   her   sewage   in   the   river,   despite   the   fact   that   this   action   produces   no  
marginal  harm.    
This   argumentative   strategy   takes   on   several   burdens.57   First,   some  
philosophers  think  that  only  individuals  can  act  wrongly.  This  view  must  be  
defeated  if  the  group-­‐mediated  account  is  to  work.    Second,  we  can  usefully  
adopt  Margaret  Gilbert’s  useful  distinction  between  ‘collectives’  –  like  families  
or  sports  teams  –  from  looser  ‘aggregates’.58  It  is  arguably  more  plausible  that  
collectives  can  act  wrongfully  than  mere  aggregates.  This  is  relevant  because  
the  group  consumers  of  animal  products  does  not  coordinate  in  the  systematic  
ways  characteristic  of  collectives.  Third,  even  if  an  account  of  responsibility  
that   applies   to   aggregates   is   developed,59   a   clear   mapping   from   group   to  
individual  wrongdoing  still  needs  to  be  provided.    
Even  if  these  theoretical  questions  can  be  adequately  addressed  in  a  
way   friendly   to   the   argument,60   one   might   wonder   whether   the   group-­‐
mediated  approach  supports  veganism  over  certain  alternative  responses  to  
the  evils  of  animal  agriculture.  To  see  the  challenge,  focus  on  an  individual  in  
Upstream.  Suppose  she  knows  that  for  the  modest  cost  of  $n  she  could  install  
a  safe  and  effective  septic  system,  and  thus  cease  to  contribute  to  polluting  
Downstream’s   drinking  water.  However,   she   knows   that   she   could   instead  
donate  $n  to  help  provide  water  filters  in  Downstream,  which  would  actually  
help   to   prevent   some   Downstream   residents   from   getting   sick.   It   seems  
plausible  that  she  has  much  stronger  reasons  to  donate  than  to  eliminate  her  
own  pollution.61  Generalizing,  if  we  suppose  that  an  individual’s  being  vegan  
involves   some   cost   to   that   individual   and   negligible   benefit   to   animals,   it  
might   seem   that   this   cost   would   be  more   constructively   borne   to   support  
direct  assistance  to  animals  (human  or  non-­‐)  rather  than  one’s  veganism.            
  
Benefit  and  complicity  
  
The   group-­‐mediated   approach   focuses   on   the   relationship   between   the  
individual  and  the  consumers  of  animal  products.  But  this  may  seem  like  an  
implausibly  indirect  relationship  to  focus  on.  After  all,  as  I  noted  at  the  end  of  
the   previous   section,   the   individuals   and   institutions   most   directly  
responsible  for  the  massive  pattern  of  wrongful  treatment  of  animals  are  the  
farms,  animal   factories,   feedlots  and  slaughterhouses.  So  we  might  want   to  
focus   on   the   relationship   of   the   individual   vegan   or   omnivore   to   these  
institutions  or  wrongful  patterns.    
Besides  making  a  difference  to  the  extent  of  the  wrongful  pattern  (the  
issue  we  discussed  under   ‘individual   efficacy’   above),   there  are  at   least   two  
ethically   relevant   relationships   that   we  might   want   to   focus   on.   First,   the  
omnivore  benefits  from  this  wrongdoing:  the  food  she  chooses  to  consume  is  
                                                                                                            
57  For  a  helpful  introduction  to  relevant  debates,  see  Smiley,  “Collective  Responsibility.”  
58  Gilbert,  “Who’s  to  Blame?”  
59  E.g.  Held,  “Random  Collection;”  Bjornsson,  “Joint  Responsibility;”  and  Pinkert,  “What  We  
Together.”  
60  E.g.  McGary,  “Morality  and  Collective  Liability.”  
61  For  a  parallel  case,  see  Björnsson,  “Joint  Responsibility,”  108.  For  relevant  discussion,  see  
also  Zimmerman,  Concept  of  Moral  Obligation,  ch.  9.  
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a  product  of  this  wrongdoing,  and  would  not  be  available  –  or  at  least,  it  would  
be  available  only  in  much  smaller  quantities  at  much  higher  prices  –  absent  
such  wrongdoing.62  Second,  the  omnivore  is  complicit  with  the  wrongdoing,  
in  the  sense  of  cooperating  with  the  wrongful  plans  of  the  more  immediate  
wrongdoers.   I  will   briefly   explore   the   prospects   of   appealing   to   the   ethical  
significance   of   one   or   both   of   these   relationships   in   defending   ethical  
veganism.        
Consider  first  benefitting.  Several  philosophers  have  argued  that  one  
can  acquire  ethical  obligations  in  virtue  of  benefitting  from  injustice.63  One  
might   think   that   some   of   these   arguments   generalize   to   benefitting   from  
significant   wrongdoing   of   other   types.   The   knowing   omnivore   chooses   to  
consume  products   that   result   from  the  wrongdoing  of   the  animal   industry.  
This  is  relevant  because  it  is  much  easier  to  motivate  the  idea  of  obligations  
in  virtue  of  voluntarily  received  benefits.64  Our  central  topic  here,  however,  is  
not  the  obligations  that  omnivores  might  take  on  in  virtue  of  their  behavior  
(itself   an   interesting   question).   Rather,   our   question   is   whether   knowing  
omnivorism  is  itself  wrong  in  virtue  of  being  an  instance  of  voluntary  benefit  
from  wrongdoing.  One  might   take   such  voluntary  benefitting   to  constitute  
the  ethical  analogue  of  the  legal  status  of  being  an  accessory  after  the  fact.65  
However,   the  ethical   significance  of   such  pure  benefitting  –  when  shorn  of  
other  ethically  features  –  are  not  clear.  For  example,  suppose  that  it  is  wrong  
to  kill  deer  in  your  context.  And  suppose  that  you  witness  a  reckless  driver  hit  
and  kill  a  deer,  then  leave  the  scene.  If  you  then  take,  dress,  and  ultimately  eat  
what  can  be  salvaged  from  the  abandoned  deer  carcass,  you  are  benefitting  
from  the  driver’s  wrongful  killing  of  the  deer.  But  it  is  far  from  clear  that  what  
you  do  in  this  case  is  wrong.66  Even  this  case  involves  a  kind  of  active  receipt  
of  goods.  By  contrast,  suppose  that  the  wrongful  killing  kept  the  deer   from  
grazing  on  your  garden.  Surely  you  do  not  act  wrongly  by  merely  receiving  
this  benefit  with  a  wrongful  genesis.    
       Recalling   the  variety  of   forms  of   ethical   veganism,  one  might   argue  
within  a  virtue-­‐theoretic  framework  that  the  willingness  to  voluntarily  benefit  
from  wrongdoing  is  a  significant  vice.  However,  if  we  again  consider  the  case  
of  the  deer  salvager,   it   is  again  not  clear  that  this  willingness  is  any  kind  of  
vice,   if   limited  to  the  sort  of  case  described.  One  might  insist  that  virtue  in  
part  consists  in  a  way  of  seeing  animals  that  takes  them  to  be  not  to  be  eaten.67  
But  one  might  suspect  that  this  sort  of  perception  is  (relatively)  virtuous  only  
assuming  the  inability  to  make  relevantly  fine-­‐grained  distinctions  between  
                                                                                                            
62  One  complication  is  that  –  as  mentioned  in  §2  –  the  omnivore’s  dietary  choices  might  in  
fact  be  overall  bad  for  her,  suggesting  a  straightforward  sense  in  which  they  do  not  benefit  
her.  However,  the  omnivore  –  at  least  immediately  –  gets  what  she  wants  in  eating  animal  
products.  And  I  suspect  that  the  argument  will  be  similarly  plausible  if  we  simply  stipulate  
that  this  counts  as  a  benefit.  
63  Thomson,  “Preferential  Hiring,”  383;  Butt,  “On  Benefitting.”  
64  Pasternak,  “Voluntary  Benefits.”  
65  Goodin  and  Barry,  “Benefitting  from  Wrongdoing,”  2.  
66  For  further  discussion  of  cases  like  this  one,  compare  Bruckner,  “Strict  Vegetarianism.”  
67  E.g.  Diamond,  “Eating  Meat,”  §3.  
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more   and   less   ethically   problematic   cases,   and   that   the   perfectly   virtuous  
person  could  regret  the  death  but  salvage  the  carcass.    
It   is   useful   to   contrast   the   case   just   considered   with   one   where  
someone  intentionally  kills  a  deer  in  order  to  sell  it,  and  then  sells  you  some  
of   the   resulting   venison.   In   this   sort   of   case,   there   is   not  merely  wrongful  
action   (as   in   the   recklessness   version   of   the   case),   but   (we  will   assume)   a  
wrongful  plan  of  action.  Further,  you  are  not  merely  benefitting  from  that  plan  
(as   in   the   case   where   killing   the   deer   saves   your   garden).   Rather,   you   are  
playing   a   key   role   in   the   execution   of   the   plan:   the   hunter’s   plan   requires  
someone   to  play   the   role  of  venison  buyer,  and  you  are  voluntarily  playing  
that   role.   This   case   seems   strikingly   ethically   different   from   the   case   of  
salvaging  venison.    
Call  knowingly  and  voluntarily  fulfilling  a  role  that  needs  to  be  fulfilled  
in  order  for  a  wrongful  plan  to  work  being  complicit  with  the  plan.  One  might  
suggest  the  following  principle:    
  
Complicity     Other   things  being  equal,   it   is  wrong   to  be  complicit  
with  others’  wrongful  plans    
  
This   principle   could   be   used   to   complete   the   schematic   argument   in   the  
following  way:  
  
1. The   institutions   that   produce  our   animal   products  have   a  wrongful  
plan    
2. Individual   consumers  of   animal  products   (non-­‐vegans)   are   typically  
complicit  with  that  plan    
3. Other  things  being  equal,  it  is  wrong  (or…)  to  be  complicit  with  others’  
wrongful  plans  (Complicity)  
C.     It  is  typically  wrong  (or…)  to  fail  to  be  vegan  
  
As  in  the  schematic  argument,  the  “(or…)”  marks  the  fact  that  one  might  argue  
for  a  variety  of  ethical   statuses   for  veganism.  The  controversial  core  of   this  
argument  is  Complicity.  In  order  for  Complicity  to  help  complete  a  case  for  
ethical   veganism,   it   would   need   to   be   refined   in   several   non-­‐trivial   ways.  
Consider  two  examples.  First,  the  set  of  roles  relevant  to  counting  as  complicit  
would  need  to  be  somehow  restricted.  For  example,  it  is  presumably  essential  
to  the  success  of  the  hunter’s  plan  that  he  not  be  caught  in  a  Heffalump  trap  
or  otherwise  prevented  from  hunting.  But  failing  to  take  such  steps  to  foil  a  
plan  seems  different   from  the  sort  of  active  complicity  described  above.  As  
this  case  brings  out,  there  seems  to  be  a  crucial  contrast  between  cooperating  
with  a  plan,  and  merely  not  interfering  with  it.68  Second,  the  contemporary  
production  of  animal  products   is   largely   implemented  by  a  highly  complex  
                                                                                                            
68  Making  this  distinction  well  is  far  from  trivial.  For  example,  if  one  had  a  standing  obligation  
to  prevent  hunting  (e.g.  one  was  the  local  game  warden,  etc.),  then  merely  turning  a  blind  eye  
to  the  hunting  would  seem  objectionable.  Or  suppose  the  hunter  held  you  in  such  esteem  that  
you  could  prevent  the  hunt  with  a  single  gentle  word,  perhaps  here  again  you  have  a  duty.  
Perhaps  failing  to  prevent  the  hunt  in  these  cases  does  not  count  as  complicity,  but  is  
objectionable  on  other  grounds.    
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system  of  corporations.  The  initial  model  of  an  individual  and  his  or  her  plan  
will  need  to  be  extended,  to  apply  to  the  complex  way  that  plans  (or  something  
like  them)  can  be  ascribed  to  corporations,  or  even  loose  collections  thereof.69  
Third,  relatively  few  consumers  purchase  meat  directly  from  the  corporations  
that  produce   the  meat.   So   the  argument  will  need   to   support   some  sort  of  
iterability:  it  will  have  to  be  claimed  that  the  consumer  is  wrongfully  complicit  
with  the  retailer  who  is  wrongfully  complicit  with  the  wholesaler,  etc.  
     It  is  also  important  to  clarify  how  Complicity  interacts  with  questions  
of  individual  efficacy.  On  the  one  hand,  individual  efficacy  arguably  makes  the  
ethical  significance  of  complicity  clearer.  My  complicity  with  your  evil  plan  
may   seem   especially   objectionable   where   it   promotes   the   success   of   that  
plan.70  However,  it  seems  objectionable  even  absent  this:  suppose  you  know  
that  the  hunter  in  our  example  above  always  has  buyers  for  his  venison:  if  you  
don’t  buy  the  venison,  someone  else  will.   I   find   it  plausible   that  complicity  
with  the  hunter  via  buying  his  venison  is  wrong  even  here.71    
Compare   a   parallel   case:      the   more   familiar   duty   of   fair   play:   this  
requires   that   I  not  benefit   from  successful   cooperative   institutions  without  
making  a  fair  contribution  to  them;  i.e.,  that  I  not  freeride.72  In  many  cases,  
freeriding  will  not  harm  anyone,  and  yet  it  appears  wrong  (other  things  being  
equal)  in  these  cases.  Of  course  duties  of  fair  play  are  controversial,  and  some  
of  the  controversy  surrounds  just  this  question  of  efficacy.73    
As  the  discussion  of  this  section  makes  clear,   it   is   far  from  trivial  to  
explain   how   to   complete   the   schematic   ‘naïve’   argument   for   veganism  
sketched  at  the  end  of  the  previous  section.  Clarifying  these  issues  is  thus  an  
important   task   as   we   seek   to  make   progress   on   understanding   the   ethical  
status  of  veganism.    
  
  
4. Complications  facing  arguments  for  veganism  
  
In  this  section,  I  discuss  a  series  of  important  complications  facing  arguments  
for  veganism  that  have  not  been  addressed  in  this  chapter  so  far.  Satisfactory  
resolution   of   these   issues   is   crucial   to   developing   a   full-­‐fledged   case   for  
                                                                                                            
69  For  an  introduction  to  collective  intentionality,  see  Schweikard  and  Schmid,  “Collective  
Intentionality.”  
70  For  an  intermediate  position,  see  Lepora  and  Goodin,  Complicity  and  Compromise,  §4.1.1,  
which  appeals  to  a  notion  of  ‘potential  essentiality’,  according  to  which  a  relatively  weak  
possibility  of  difference-­‐making  is  necessary  for  complicity.    
71  Mark  Budolfson,  “The  Inefficacy  Objection  to  Deontology,”  has  argued  for  a  further  important  
variant  of  a  complicity  view.  He  proposes  that  how  essential  the  wrongness  of  the  production  
of  a  product  is  can  affect  how  wrong  it  is  to  consume  it.  For  example,  it  is  worse  to  purchase  
the  archetypal  Nazi-­‐made  soap  than  it  is  to  purchase  a  watch  made  in  a  concentration  camp,  
because   the   fact   that   the  soap   is  made   from  human   fat  makes   the  wrongful  character  of   its  
production  more  essential  than  the  wrongful  character  of  the  production  of  the  watch  was.  This  
sort   of   idea  might   be   used   to   defend   the   idea   that   it   is  wrong   to   eat   beef,  where  wrongful  
treatment  of  animals  is  relatively  essential,  but  not  wrong  to  drink  milk,  because  the  wrongful  
treatment  of  cows  is  inessential  to  the  necessary  means  of  producing  milk.    
72  Klosko,  Principle  of  Fairness.  
73  E.g.  Smith,  “Prima  Facie  Obligation.”  For  a  reply,  see  Dagger,  Civic  Virtues,  71.  
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veganism.   This   section   briefly   considers   complications   arising   from  
considerations  of  aggregation,  the  demandingness  of  the  principles  needed  to  
argue  for  the  claim  that  veganism  is  obligatory,  the  defeasibility  of  the  ethical  
principles  that  support  veganism,  the  specificity  of  the  response  required  of  
vegans,   and   methodological   objections   to   typical   ‘intuitive’   arguments   for  
veganism.      I   begin   by   considering   challenges   to   the   ethical   significance   of  
animal  suffering  and  death.    
  
How  bad  is  animal  suffering  and  death?  
  
The   argument   of   §3   assumed   that   animals   can   suffer.   However,   this  
assumption  has  been  challenged.  In  order  to  answer  this  question  properly,  
we  would  need  to  examine  several  complex  questions  about  the  nature  and  
ethical  significance  of  pain  and  suffering.    
One  way  to  turn  these  questions  into  a  challenge  begins  by  noting  that  
it  is  the  qualitative  nature  of  suffering  –  what  it  is  like  for  the  sufferer  –  that  
seems  most  clearly  ethically  significant.74  For  example,  if  we  built  a  robot  that  
was   behaviorally   very   similar   to   a   cat,   but   which   had   no   phenomenal  
experiences,  it  is  very  unclear  whether  there  would  be  anything  intrinsically  
wrong   with   treating   the   robot   in   ways   that   elicited   very   strong   aversive  
behavioral  responses.  (Of  course,  that  someone  would  choose  to  do  this  to  the  
robot  would  be  disturbing,  but  it  would  be  disturbing  in  roughly  the  way  it  
would  be  disturbing  for  someone  to  choose  to  play  a  video  game  in  which  their  
avatar  graphically  tortured  cats.)    
The   thesis   that   ethically   significant   suffering   is   a   phenomenal   state  
entails   significant   epistemic   difficulties   for   supporting   the   claim   that   non-­‐
human   animals   can   suffer.   First,   there   is   no   agreement   about   what  
phenomenal   experience   consists   in   (is   it   irreducible,   or   can   it   be   given   a  
functional   characterization,   for   example?).   An   empirically   informed  
methodology   here   will   seek   to   identify   functional,   evolutionary,   and  
neurological  correlates  for  phenomenal  states.  But  there  are  many  interesting  
functional  and  neurological  similarities  and  differences  between  humans  and  
non-­‐human  animals.  This  makes  the  ‘problem  of  non-­‐human  animals  minds’  
an  empirically  and  philosophically  complex  issue.    
Some  philosophers  have  argued  on   this  basis   that   it   is   a  mistake   to  
think  that  animals  can  suffer.75  However,  it  is  worth  noting  that  this  sort  of  
argument  can  only  be  as  plausible  as  the  underlying  philosophical  theory  of  
phenomenal   consciousness,  which   at   very   least   counsels   caution.   If  we   set  
aside  these  challenges,  we  confront  a  less  radical  challenge:  the  strongest  case  
for  the  possibility  of  animal  suffering  is  presumably  in  those  animals  that  are  
biologically   and   evolutionarily   closest   to   humans   –   i.e.   mammals.   The  
question  of  whether  other  animals  –  most  saliently  birds  and  fish  –  can  suffer  
                                                                                                            
74  For  a  case  for  potentially  ethically  significant  animal  mental  states  that  do  not  involve  
phenomenal  consciousness,  see  Carruthers,  “Suffering  without  Subjectivity.”  
75  E.g.  Dennett,  Brainchildren,  161-­‐8.  
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is  deeply   complicated.76  This  may   leave   a   version  of   veganism   restricted   to  
mammals   in   a   significantly   stronger   position   that   those  which   range  more  
broadly  across  the  animal  kingdom.    
   If  we  suppose  that  (certain)  animals  can  suffer,  this  does  not  settle  how  
bad  that  suffering  is.  Imagine  your  shoulder  is  aching:  how  bad  this  is  for  you  
is  in  large  part  a  function  of  its  meaning  for  you:  experienced  as  a  reminder  of  
a  vigorous  workout,  it  will  seem  much  less  unpleasant  and  significant  than  if  
it   is  understood  as  a  symptom  of  your  developing  arthritis.   It   is  difficult   to  
know   whether   animals   can   experience   their   suffering   as   meaningful   in  
anything  like  these  ways.  This  might  tend  to  reduce  the  significance  of  animal  
suffering.77   If   animal   suffering  were   systematically  not   that  bad,   this  might  
attenuate   the  badness  of  contemporary  animal  agriculture.  However   this   is  
not  very  plausible,  for  at  least  two  reasons.  First,  some  non-­‐human  animals  do  
appear   to   attribute   significance   to   their   experiences:   witness   the   extended  
distress  of  cows  or  pigs  separated  early  from  their  young.  Second,  the  idea  that  
perceived  meaning  affects  the  badness  of  pain  is  perhaps  most  plausible  for  
relatively  mild  pains:  it  is  characteristic  of  agony  that  it  crowds  out  all  such  
reflective  perspective  on  one’s  state.                              
The   argument   for   the  wrongness   of   killing   animals   discussed   in   §3  
above  appealed  in  part  to  the  value  of  an  animal’s  future  if  it  were  not  killed.  
One  might   challenge   this   argument   by   appealing   to   philosophical   theories  
about   personal   identity,   or   (more   broadly)   the   conditions   for   ethically  
significant   survival.   On   a   leading   cluster   of   accounts,   certain   relations   of  
psychological  continuity  is  required  for  ethically  significant  survival.78  On  this  
view,   we   need   to   ask:   do   many   non-­‐human   animals   have   rich   enough  
psychological   connections   to  underwrite   the   intuitive   thought   that   a   given  
cow  (e.g.)  is  the  same  moral  patient  over  (much  of)  its  biological  lifetime?  If  
not,  this  view  might  entail  that  for  ethical  purposes,  a  cow  should  be  treated  
as   constituted   by   a   succession   of   distinct   ethically   significant   beings.   This  
would  in  turn  mean  that  painlessly  killing  the  cow  would  not  be  depriving  it  
of  a  significant  valuable  future,  but  rather  preventing  the  existence  of  its  many  
successors.  Because  many  philosophers  are  skeptical  that  we  have  any  weighty  
duties  to  bring  valuable  lives  into  existence,  this  conclusion  would  undercut  
what   is  otherwise  the  most  plausible  argument  for  the  wrongness  of  killing  
non-­‐human  animals.    
As  with  the  preceding  challenge,  I  am  cautiously  optimistic  that  this  
challenge   can   be  met,   at   least   in  many   cases.   For   example,  many   animals  
appear   capable   of   various   forms   of  memory.79   However,   as   with   questions  
about  animal  pain  and  suffering,  answers  here  are  likely  to  vary  substantially  
across   species   in   ways   that   require   careful   empirical   work   to   tease   out.  
Further,   as   with   the   case   of   suffering,   this   argument   takes   controversial  
philosophical  theory  as  an  essential  premise.  For  example,  on  accounts  which  
                                                                                                            
76  For  an  introduction  to  the  study  of  animal  consciousness,  see  Allen  and  Trestman,  “Animal  
Consciousness.”  
77  For  an  argument  that  it  can  also  make  it  worse,  see  Akhtar,  “Animal  Pain  and  Welfare.”  
78  For  discussion,  see  Olson,  “Personal  Identity,”  esp.  §4.  
79  Allen  and  Trestman,  “Animal  Consciousness,”  §7.4.  
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make  continuity  of  brain  or  organism  essential  to  ethically  significant  survival,  




It  is  often  insisted  that  persons  are  ethically  separate.80  While  it  usually  seems  
reasonable  for  me  to  impose  a  cost  on  myself  now  in  order  to  attain  a  greater  
benefit  later,  it  can  seem  objectionable  to  impose  a  cost  on  one  person  in  order  
to  benefit  others  more.  The  force  of  this  idea  is  perhaps  best  dramatized  in  
Judith  Thomson’s  transplant  case,  where  we  are  asked  to  imagine  that  a  doctor  
could   carve   up   a   healthy   patient   and   distribute   his   organs   to   five   others  
needing  transplants,  thereby  saving  five  lives  but  killing  the  initial  patient.81    
The  view  that  carving  up  the  patient  would  be  very  wrong  is  widely  
shared.  But  similar  cases  involving  non-­‐human  animals  are  much  less  clear.  
Imagine  the  relevant  case:  your  roving  high-­‐tech  veterinary  clinic   finds   five  
young  deer  in  need  of  organs.  The  deer  population  around  here  is  stable,  and  
you  know  these  deer  would  live  a  long  and  happy  life  if  saved  from  imminent  
organ  failure.  As  it  turns  out,  you  find  a  sixth,  healthy  deer  with  the  requisite  
biological  compatibilities  to  be  the  ‘donor’.  Would  it  be  wrong  to  carve  this  
deer  up  to  save  the  other  five?  It  is  at  least  unclear  whether  it  is.  If  this  point  
generalizes,   it   might   suggest   that   there   is   no   ‘separateness   of   non-­‐human  
animals’:  that  there  is  no  moral  objection  to  harming  or  killing  one  animal  as  
a  means  to  bringing  about  an  outcome  that  is  best  overall.82      
The  idea  that  animal  ethics  should  focus  on  aggregate  effects  would  
have   significant   implications.   For   example,   consider   culling   populations   of  
animals   that   would   otherwise   –   in   the   absence   of   non-­‐human   predators   –  
predictably   go   through   cycles   of   population   explosion   and   starvation.   The  
most  obvious  objection  to  this  policy  is  that  it  harms  the  animals  culled,  but  
if   the   culling   is   best   for   the   population   in   aggregate,   the   anti-­‐separateness  
thesis  would  undercut  the  objection.  Returning  to  veganism,  if  the  culling  is  
legitimate,  objections  to  then  eating  or  otherwise  using  the  culled  animals  will  






                                                                                                            
80  E.g.  Rawls,  Theory  of  Justice,  §5-­‐6.  
81  Thomson,  “Trolley  Problem,”  1396.  
82  For  relevant  discussion  of  this  hypothesis,  see  Nozick  Anarchy,  State  and  Utopia,  35-­‐42.      
83  The  ethical  legitimacy  of  aggregation  might  also  seem  to  support  a  controversial  objection  to  
veganism:  that  widespread  veganism  would  tend  to  lead  to  the  existence  of  far  fewer  cows,  pigs,  
chickens  etc.  If  we  assume  (controversially)  that  these  animals  currently  tend  to  have  lives  that  
are  worth  living,  this  would  entail  that  veganism  was  worse  overall  for  animals.  And  aggregation  
might  seem  to  bolster  this  argument.  This  argument  faces  severe  further  difficulties,  however.  
Here  are  two:  First,  reduced  numbers  of  farm  animals  will  likely  be  accompanied  by  increased  
numbers  of  wild  animals;  Second,  this  argument  likely  require  controversial  views  about  the  
ethical   significance   of   bringing   entities   with   valuable   lives   into   existence   (for   the   classic  
discussion  of  this  issue,  see  Parfit,  Reasons  and  Persons,  Part  Four).  





Several  philosophers  have  reported  to  me  that  they  accept  the  soundness  of  
arguments  for  veganism,  but  have  not  become  vegan.84  One  explanation  for  
this   phenomenon   is   that   –   at   least   for  many  people   –   it   is   very  difficult   to  
become  vegan:  doing  so  would  require  abandoning  cherished  foods,  coping  
with  a  host  of  new  inconveniences,  developing  new  tastes  and  learning  a  host  
of   new   skills,   not   to   mention   potentially   creating   conflict   in   a   host   of  
relationships.  While   the   thesis   that   veganism   is  obligatory   is   thus  arguably  
quite   demanding,   it   may   also   be   that   the   arguments   needed   to   defend   a  
requirement   to   be   vegan   have   implications   that   are   far   more   demanding.  
Consider  two  examples  that  may  help  to  illustrate  this  idea.  First,  the  appeal  
to  individual  causal  efficacy  is  most  straightforwardly  developed  into  a  case  
for  veganism  when  combined  with  a  principle  that  prohibits  selecting  options  
that  will  promote  something  very  bad  happening.  But  –  as  we  saw  above  in  
the  example  of  choosing  between  a  vacation  and  a  charitable  donation  –  such  
principles  might  be  otherwise  quite  demanding,  requiring  us  to  sacrifice  many  
pleasures  in  order  to  help  others  avert  terrible  fates.    
Or  consider  the  appeal  to  a  complicity  principle,  also  discussed  in  the  
previous  section.  Thomas  Pogge  has  argued  that  the  causal  interconnections  
in  the  world  are  so  dense  and  complex  that  an  ordinary  affluent  person  has  
likely  been   involved  both   in   transactions   that   caused  deaths  and  ones   that  
saved   lives.85   Because   it   is   plausible   that  many  of   the  nodes   in   this  web  of  
transactions  involve  unjust  rules  and  wrongful  actions,  one  might  worry  that  
one  cannot  help  but  be  complicit  with  wrongdoing.    
If  these  sketchy  examples  reflect  a  general  pattern,  then  an  obligation  
to  be  vegan  may  only  be  defensible  as  part  of  a  highly  demanding  overall  ethic.  
If  such  demandingness  renders  an  ethical  theory  implausible,  this  would  in  
turn  pose  a  clear  and  relatively  neglected  challenge  to  any  claim  that  veganism  




As  I  noted  in  §1,  plausible  forms  of  ethical  veganism  will  be  defeasible:  that  is,  
they  will  allow  that  there  are  a  range  of  possible  circumstances  in  which  it  is  
permissible   to   use   animal   products.  One  might   argue   that   demandingness  
itself   can   constitute   a   relevant   defeating   condition.   For   example,   in   many  
cases,   animal   products   are   an   essential   element   of   the   only   available  
nutritionally   adequate   human   diets.   This   is   true   for  many   hunter-­‐gatherer  
cultures  as  well  as  for  many  subsistence  farmers,  for  whom  having  a  cow  –  or  
even  a  handful  of  chickens  –  can  offer  crucial  protection  against  certain  forms  
of  malnutrition.    
                                                                                                            
84  For  non-­‐anecdotal  evidence  that  philosophers’  failing  to  act  on  their  belief  that  they  should  
be  vegetarian  is  widespread,  see  Schwitzgebel  and  Rust,  “Moral  Behavior.”  
85  Pogge,  “Severe  Poverty”,  17.  
86  For  a  related  worry,  see  Gruen  and  Jones,  “Veganism  as  an  Aspiration.”  
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Ideally,   the   proponent   of   an   obligation   to   be   vegan   would   seek   a  
principled  account  of  defeasibility  conditions  that  (a)  granted  permissibility  
in  these  sorts  of  cases,  and  (b)  applied  more  generally,  in  a  way  that  reduced  
the   force   of   the   demandingness   challenge,   but   (c)   did   not   permit   the  
difficulties   involved   in   becoming   vegan   mentioned   above   to   defeat   the  
obligation  more  generally.  It  is  an  open  question  whether  such  an  account  can  
be  developed.  If  it  cannot,  the  proponent  of  an  obligation  to  be  vegan  may  be  
further   committed   to   implausible   demandingness   in   light   of   too-­‐limited  




The  core  of  veganism  involves  eschewing  use  of  animal  products.  As  we  saw  
in   §1,   one  might   think   that   our   relationships   to   non-­‐human   animals   have  
other  ethical  implications:  implications  for  how  our  political  lives  should  be  
organized,  for  what  our  political  priorities  should  be,  and  for  how  we  interact  
with  other  humans.  One  possibility  is  that  the  best  case  for  veganism  entails  
obligations  of  all  of  these  types.  This  conclusion  would  suggest  a  further  way  
in  which  arguments  for  ethical  veganism  might  be  highly  demanding.    
One   natural   way   of   mitigating   the   demandingness   of   an   ethical  
desideratum  is  to  permit  agents  options  as  to  how  they  respond  to  it.  On  this  
sort  of  view,  it  might  be  argued  that  while  the  massive  wrongdoing  in  animal  
agriculture  demands  some  response  from  each  of  us,  a  range  of  such  responses  
might   be   permissible.   For   example,   consider   someone   who   reasonably  
believes  that  transitioning  to  veganism  would  involve  significant  sacrifices  to  
her   well-­‐being.   Suppose   that   this   person   instead   practiced   ethical  
omnivorism,   while   simultaneously   dedicating   a   significant   portion   of   her  
political   and   financial   resources   to   supporting   organizations   that   she  
reasonably   believed   would   best   help   to   promote   animal   welfare.   Absent   a  
highly   demanding   ethical   theory,   it  might   seem   that   such   a   person  would  
count  as  meeting  her  ethical  obligations.87                
  
The  methodological  burdens  of  revisionism  
  
An   important   question   about   demandingness   objections   concerns  whether  
they   should   centrally   be   understood   as   targeting   the   demandingness   of   a  
candidate  theory,  or  the  fact  that  the  particular  demands  in  question  fly  in  the  
face  of  common  sense.  To  see  the  contrast,  consider  the  claim  that  one  might  
be  required  to  endure  great  sacrifices  to  save  one’s  child,  or  that  a  soldier  can  
be   required   to   sacrifice  his   life   for  his   country.  These  are   theses   that  make  
ethics   very   demanding,   at   least   in   certain   contexts.   But   it   is   not   clear   that  
having   such   implications   counts   significantly   against   an   ethical   theory:  
                                                                                                            
87  For  relevant  discussion  taking  Peter  Singer  as  its  foil,  see  Frey,  Rights,  Killing  and  Suffering,  
ch.  16.  It  is  illuminating  here  that  the  Animal  Liberation  Front  –  a  radical  group  that  
advocates  direct  and  often  illegal  action  in  defense  of  animals  –  holds  being  vegan  or  
vegetarian  as  a  minimal  requirement  for  association.  “Credo  and  Guidelines,”  Animal  
Liberation  Front,  accessed  dd,  
http://www.animalliberationfront.com/ALFront/alf_credo.htm.  
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intuitively,  they  simply  show  that  sometimes  it  is  hard  to  do  the  right  thing.  
This  might  suggest  that  demandingness  per  se  is  not  a  problem.  Rather,  being  
demanding  in  certain  respects  might  simply  be  one  way  in  which  an  ethical  
theory  can  fly  in  the  face  of  common  sense.  Any  argument  for  an  obligation  
to  be  vegan  will  arguably  be  a  philosophical  argument  against  common  sense.  
Influential  Moorean   views   in   epistemology   claim   that   such   arguments   are  
quite  generally  dubious.88    
   One  might  think  that  such  skepticism  is  especially  powerful  against  
the  sort  of  view  sketched  in  §§3-­‐4,  for  two  reasons.  First,  as  the  discussion  of  
this  chapter  illustrates,  any  fully-­‐developed  ethical  argument  for  an  obligation  
to   be   vegan   will   be   quite   complex.   Second,   the   argument   of   §3   is  
methodologically  naïve:  it  aims  simply  to  appeal  to  clear  intuitive  judgments.  
But  if  the  permissibility  of  eating  a  cheeseburger  is  also  commonsensical,  then  
one  might   think   that   the   best   such   arguments   can   hope   to   show   is   that   a  
certain  complicated  set  of  our  intuitive  judgments  is  inconsistent.  One  might  
wonder  why,  in  this  case,  one  should  be  confident  that  the  permissibility  of  
eating  a  cheeseburger  is  the  judgment  that  should  be  abandoned.89    
   One  task  for  the  ethical  vegan  is  to  rebut  such  arguments.  If  this  is  not  
possible,   one   possible   way   to   reply   involves   being   epistemically   –   but   not  
practically   –   concessive.   For   example,   one   might   grant   that   it   is   unclear  
whether   the  best  arguments   for  veganism  put  us   in  a  position  to  know   that  
veganism  is  obligatory.  The  epistemically  concessive  vegan  might  argue  that  
nonetheless,  the  arguments  are  at  least  strong  enough  to  entail  that  we  ought  
to  suspend  judgment  concerning  the  thesis  that  veganism  is  obligatory.  And  
here  they  might  advocate  an  ethical  precautionary  principle:  if  we  cannot  tell  
whether  doing  A  is  wrong,  then  we  ought,  other  things  being  equal  to  refrain  
from  doing  A.  This  is  a  quite  different  way  of  thinking  about  ethical  veganism:  
on  this  gloss,  we  can  know  that  the  lifestyle  is  required,  not  in  virtue  of  the  
first-­‐order   ethical   facts,   but   as   an   ethical   response   to   reasonable   ethical  
uncertainty.90          
   Another  way  of  replying  is  to  grant  that  naïve  theorizing  might  not  be  
enough   to   establish   ethical   veganism.  Perhaps  naïve   arguments  need   to  be  
supplemented   by   methodological   arguments   that   can   rebut   the   Moorean  
strategy   here,   and   provide   a   principled   means   of   explaining   why   the  
permissibility  of  eating  a  cheeseburger  does  not  survive  the  putative  conflict  





Ethical   veganism   can   be   initially   motivated   by   compelling   insights:   that  
animals  matter  ethically,  that  our  collective  treatment  of  non-­‐human  animals  
                                                                                                            
88  For  discussion,  see  McPherson,  “Moorean  Arguments”  and  “Moorean  Defense?”  
89  McPherson,  “Case  for  Ethical  Veganism”,  §3.  
90  For  contrasting  assessments  of  the  underlying  precautionary  idea,  see  on  the  one  hand  
Guererro,  “Don’t  Know,  Don’t  Kill;”  and  Moller,  “Abortion  and  Moral  Risk;”  and  on  the  other,  
Weatherson,  “Running  Risks  Morally.”  
91  McPherson,  “Moorean  Defense?”  and  “Case  for  Ethical  Veganism”.  
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is  one  of  the  great  contemporary  horrors,  and  that  these  facts  make  an  ethical  
demand  on  each  of  us.  This  chapter  has  sought  to  illuminate  the  dialectic  that  
arises   when   one   attempts   to   develop   these   and   other   motivations   into   a  
philosophically  careful  argument.  As  I  have  sought  to  make  clear,  there  are  
many  possible  species  of  ethical  veganism  worth  investigating,  there  are  many  
philosophical  resources  that  can  be  levied  into  arguments  for  one  or  another  
vegan  thesis,  and  there  are  many  deep  challenges  facing  these  arguments.  I  
have  argued  that  there  is  a  powerful  core  case  for  veganism,  but  that  this  case  
is  in  several  important  respects  incomplete  or  poorly  developed.  I  hope  that  
this   chapter   will   enable   and   encourage   others   to   rigorously   address   these  
topics,   thereby  allowing  us  all   to  better  understand  the  ethics  of  veganism,  
and  –  more  broadly  –  the  ethics  of  our  relationships  to  non-­‐human  animals  
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